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Abstract
We study a Bayesian game of two-sided incomplete information in which an agent, who
owns a project of unknown quality, considers proposing it to an evaluator, who has the choice of
whether or not to accept it. There exist two distinct tiers of evaluation that di¤er in the benets
they deliver to the agent upon acceptance of a project. The agent has to select the tier to which
the project is submitted for review. Making a proposal incurs a cost on the agent in the form
of a submission fee. We examine the e¤ect of a change in the submission fees at the two tiers of
evaluation on the expected quality of projects that are implemented by the evaluator.
JEL Classication: D02, D82.
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1 Introduction
We study a Bayesian game in which an agent, who owns a project of unknown quality, considers
proposing it to an evaluator, who upon receiving a project for review, has the choice of whether or
not to accept it. Prior to taking their actions, each player performs an assessment of the project
that yields a private signal of quality. Making the proposal incurs a cost on the agent in the form of
a submission fee.1 There exist two distinct tiers of evaluation in which a project can be accepted,
an upper tier and a lower tier. If the agent submits a project, he has to select the tier to which
to submit it. The upper tier entails higher submission costs, delivers higher benets to the agent
upon acceptance, and higher losses to the evaluator upon acceptance of a low-quality project.
A real world application of this framework is that of a prosecutor deciding on the charges to
le, if any, against a defendant in a trial. Filing more severe charges incurs higher costs on the
prosecution in the form of resources spent on collecting evidence, and induces a more stringent
burden of proof, but the rewards following a favorable ruling by the jury are also higher.2
The main objective of this paper is to study the e¤ects of submission fees, in their role of
instruments of control of the level of self-screening exerted by the agent, on the expected quality
of projects implemented by the evaluator.
Several recent papers, starting with Leslie (2005), investigate the optimal submission fee problem
and show that these optimal fees are strictly positive3 because they reduce the burden on the
evaluators by discouraging long-shot submissions.4 Departing from earlier papers, in a framework
1This fee may be a payment toward the evaluator or a third entity, or it may take a non-monetary form, such as
a cost incurred by the agent in terms of time or resources spent on preparing the application or in terms of time by
which the evaluators decision is delayed.
2Another example would be that of a rm interested in developing an economic activity in an environmentally
sensitive area. Di¤erent extents of intrusion in this area may entail di¤erent assessments of the trade-o¤s between
its social benets and costs. Finally, another example would be that of a manufacturer of a new regulated product,
who has to decide on the strength of claims to make regarding its benets and risks.
3The optimal fees are not unboudedly high because in these models, the evaluators need to accept a minimum
number of articles. In our paper, we discard this requirement on the evaluator so as to capture situations of project
screening beyond that of the academic articles evaluation examined in those papers.
4Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) conrm the insight from Leslie (2005) in a search theoretical model where an
author facing multiple journals has to decide on the optimal submission path. See also Azar (2007) and the references
therein. Cotton (2012) distinguishes between monetary costs and time delays and shows that when authors of
academic articles are heterogenous, the optimal fee structure implies a combination of these monetary and non-
monetary fees. Boleslavsky and Cotton (2011) study a model in which an evaluator has to select one of several
competing proposals of unknown quality, and investigate the e¤ect of the limited capacity of the evaluator to accept
proposals on the incentives of the proposers to produce information.
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with one tier of evaluation, Barbos (2012) considers the case of two-sided incomplete information
where not only the agents, but also the evaluators assessment of the project is imperfect. Under
this specication, while a higher submission fee does increase the quality of projects that the agent
submits, it may not always be benecial, as it also induces the evaluator to weaken his standards
of acceptance. In particular, if the elasticity of the likelihood of a high-quality project as inferred
from the evaluators minimum quality standard is lower than the elasticity of the likelihood of
a high-quality project as inferred from the fact that the evaluator accepted a project, a higher
submission fee will decrease the expected quality of projects that are implemented.
The model with multiple tiers examined in this paper unveils four main insights.
1. We rst investigate the assortative matching between the agents signal of quality and the
rank of the tier to which he submits the project. We show that if the submission fee at the upper tier
is low enough so as to induce the agent to exert insu¢ cient self-screening at that tier, then negative
assortative matching may emerge in equilibrium, where projects with high signals of quality are
submitted to the lower tier while projects of lower quality are submitted to the upper tier.
2. Focusing on equilibria with positive assortative matching, we argue that in contrast to the
earlier literature, with a tiered system of evaluation, higher fees are not unequivocally benecial
for the quality of projects submitted for review. In particular, a higher submission fee at the upper
tier decreases the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers. A higher fee at the lower tier
does discourage marginal submissions to that tier, and therefore increases the quality of projects
submitted between the two tiers, but may lower the quality of projects submitted to the upper tier.
3. For the same class of information structures identied in the case of a system of evaluation
with a single tier, a higher submission fee at the upper tier increases the expected quality of projects
that are implemented by each of the two tiers. On the other hand, since a higher submission fee
at the lower tier may decrease the quality of projects submitted at either of the two tiers, its
e¤ect on the expected quality of projects that are implemented depends not only on the underlying
information structure, but also on its impact on the evaluators equilibrium strategy.
4. The last main result of the paper compares the equilibria of the games with one and two tiers,
and provides support for a tiered system of evaluation as an e¢ cient project-screening mechanism.
As with the case of the main nding from Barbos (2012), the insights from this paper hinge on
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the assumption of imprecise evaluation, which renders the evaluator a strategic player who adjusts
his acceptance policy in response to the increase in the quality of projects submitted for review
that is induced by a higher submission fee. From a policy perspective, this suggests that in those
situations where there is reason to believe that the evaluator may infer information from the agents
decision, such as if a prosecutors choice of the charges to le in a trial were likely to inuence the
jurys beliefs, then when studying the optimal submission fee problem, one has to account for that
fact that an increase in the perceived quality of projects submitted for review may come at the
expense of the evaluators own judgment of the project.
At a formal level, the paper from the literature that is closer to ours is Taylor and Yildirim
(2011), which studies a model of project proposals in which an agent chooses the amount of e¤ort
to exert in generating a project that is then submitted for review. A blind review system, in which
payo¤ relevant information about the proposer is hidden from the reviewer, is compared with an
informed regime in which the proposers type is public information. While their results are driven
by the moral hazard e¤ects of the potentially available public information, we consider the e¤ort
level as sunk, and the agents decision to be whether and where to submit a project, as a function
of the available public and private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the model, while in section 3 we
characterize the equilibrium of the game. In section 4 we investigate the e¤ect of submission fees
on equilibrium strategies and on the e¢ ciency of the outcome. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two players, an agent (A) and an evaluator (E). A owns a project and considers proposing
it to E . The project is of either high (h) or low (l) quality. The common prior probability of state
h is . There are two tiers of evaluation, A and B, and when A submits a project, he has to select
the tier to which to submit it. Upon receiving a project for review into a certain tier, E has the
choice of whether to accept it or not. Submitting the project to tier t 2 fA;Bg incurs a fee ct on
A. Irrespective of its ex-post observed quality, a project accepted in tier t, yields A a payo¤ bt. A
also has the option to not submit the project; the corresponding payo¤ is normalized to zero. Es
payo¤ from accepting a high-quality project in either tier is 1, while the loss incurred by E from
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accepting a low-quality project in tier t is Lt. Es payo¤ from rejecting a project is normalized to
zero.5 A project that is rejected once cannot be resubmitted for review to either tier.6 We make
the following assumption on the payo¤ parameters of the model.
Assumption 1 (i) bA > bB; (ii) bAcA >
bB
cB
; (iii) LA > LB.
By (i) and (ii), tier A delivers a better absolute and relative reward to A from an accepted
project than tier B. We will refer to A and B as the upper and lower tier, respectively. Part (iii)
implies that E is aversely a¤ected more by the acceptance of a low-quality project in the upper tier.
Prior to making their decisions, A and E perform assessments of the project that result in
subjective evaluations of its quality. As assessment yields a private signal  2 [0; 1]; Es assessment
yields a private signal  2 [0; 1]. For quality q 2 fh; lg, let Gq() and F q() denote the cumulative
distribution functions of the agent and the evaluatorssignals, respectively. Also, let gq() > 0 and
f q() > 0 be the corresponding probability density functions.
Assumption 2 (i) f q and gq are bounded and twice continuously di¤erentiable for q 2 fh; lg; (ii)
d
d
h
fh()
f l()
i
> 0, dd
h
gh()
gl()
i
> 0.
Part (ii) of the assumption is the usual monotone likelihood ratio, essentially implying that a
higher signal is more informative of a high-quality project.
3 The equilibrium
Consider some arbitrary strategies of A and E , respectively, Sag : [0; 1] ! fsA; sB; ng and Sev :
fA;Bg  [0; 1] ! fa; rg, with the obvious interpretation of the action labels. Upon observing a
5The analysis does not change in a meaningful way if we allow the agents payo¤ to also depend on the quality of
the project by having him prefer that an accepted project is of high quality. See section 3 for the discussion. Also,
the analysis also does not change if we allow that the evaluator be also concerned with the quality of projects that he
rejects. Finally, since the submission fee may often take a non-monetary form, we do not include it in the evaluators
payo¤. This is without too much loss of generality for the ensuing results. These simplifying modelling specications
are also adopted elsewhere in the literature (see for instance, Cotton (2012)).
6 In line with the motivating example from the introduction, we thus restrict attention to the analysis of those
situations when resubmission of a rejected project to a di¤erent tier is not possible (according to the principle of no
double jeopardy, a defendant acquitted in a criminal trial cannot be prosecuted again for the same o¤ense). The
analysis of the case when resubmission is possible requires a di¤erent approach to be undertaken in a separate paper.
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project submitted to tier t, and after acquiring the signal , E accepts the project if and only if
Pr(hjfstg; )  1 + [1  Pr(hjfstg; )] ( Lt)  0() Pr(hjfstg; )  Lt
1 + Lt
(1)
where the event fstg  f 2 [0; 1] : Sag () = stg. Denoting the event fatg  f 2 [0; 1] :
Sev (t; ) = ag, it follows that A submits a project with quality signal  to tier A if
bA Pr (faAgj)  cA  max f0; bB Pr (faBgj)  cBg (2)
to tier B if
bB Pr (faBgj)  cB  max f0; bA Pr (faAgj)  cAg (3)
and does not submit the project in the remaining case.
In appendix A1 we show that in any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, E adopts a cuto¤ strategy with
respect to his informative signal, according to which he accepts a project if and only if his signal is
higher than a threshold specic to each tier. Since Es equilibrium strategy can be dened in terms
of the corresponding thresholds, for the rest of the paper, we will use (As; Bs) to denote a generic
cuto¤ strategy, with thresholds of acceptance for the two tiers As and Bs, respectively. We also
show in appendix A1 that the set of values of  for which A submits projects to a particular tier is
an interval (possibly empty), and that the set of values of  for which A does not submit a project
consists of either one (possibly empty) or two disjoint intervals.
The next lemma states that, under assumption 1, if E adopts a cuto¤ strategy (As; Bs), with
Bs  As, then As best response is to never submit to tier B. Its proof from appendix A2 shows
that whenever A has a higher expected payo¤ from submitting to tier B than to A, then that payo¤
is in fact negative. In the following we thus examine the interesting equilibria where Bs < As.
Lemma 3.1 If Bs  As, then A either submits the project to tier A or does not submit it at all.
In appendix A3, we examine the agents best response function and provide the necessary and
su¢ cient condition for positive assortative matching between the agents signal of quality and the
rank of the tier to whom he submits a project. More precisely, we identify the condition on As,
Bs, and the payo¤ parameters of the model under which for a given prior , the set of  for
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which A submits to the upper tier A is above the set of signals for which he submits to B.7 This
condition is not always satised, and thus negative assortative matching may emerge, where A
submits projects with low signals to the upper tier, and projects with high signals to the lower tier.
As shown in the appendix, negative assortative matching emerges when the following conditions
are satised: (i) cA is low, (ii) As is high, (iii) Bs belongs to a subset of moderate values of [0; 1]
that allows a high level of identication of the quality of the project when submitting it to B.8
When these conditions are satised, if A has a project with a high signal, he prefers submitting it
to tier B, to have it identied as of high quality and thus accepted, rather than submitting it to A,
where the probability of acceptance is very low because of the very high standards of acceptance.
When As signal is lower (but not too low), he will submit to A because the low submission cost will
allow for a non-negative payo¤ in spite of the low probability of acceptance. For the lowest signals,
A will refrain from submitting the project. On the other hand, given this strategy adopted by A,
Es best response is precisely to employ very high standards of acceptance to the upper tier and
moderate ones to the lower tier. Thus, negative assortative matching may occur in equilibrium.
This is an interesting and surprising insight, as it suggests that when the project evaluation
relies insu¢ ciently on the agents self-screening mechanism at the upper tier (i.e., when cA is low),
thus requiring the evaluator to rely heavily on his own assessment of the project at that tier, by
imposing very high acceptance standards, then negative assortative matching may emerge.
We focus the analysis on the interesting case of interior equilibria with positive assortative
matching in which both tiers receive submissions and in which the set of values of  for which
the agent does not submit the project is an interval.9 More precisely, we investigate properties
of equilibria in which A adopts a cuto¤ strategy characterized by two thresholds (As; Bs), with
As 2 (0; 1), Bs 2 (0; 1), and As > Bs, such that A submits to tier A for  2 [As; 1], to tier B
for  2 [Bs; As), and does not submit the project for  2 [0; Bs). We will assume thus implicitly
throughout the rest of the paper that the parameters of the model are such that the corresponding
7This condition is reminiscent of the supermodularity condition, which since Becker (1973) is known to be necessary
and su¢ cient for positive assortative matching in the equilibrium allocation of many applications.
8More precisely, when the di¤erence F l(Bs) Fh(Bs) is high, which implies that E will observe a signal   Bs
with high probability, conditional on h, and with a low probability, conditional on l.
9As best response function may involve a corner solution. In particular, if ts and ctbt are high enough for some
t 2 fA;Bg, A never submits to tier t. Moreover, when bA
cA
is much higher than bB
cB
, tier B receives no submissions. To
focus our analysis on developing intuition rather than solving for corner solutions, we restrict attention to the case
of interior equilibria.
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equilibria satisfy this regularity property, without explicitly mentioning this assumption each time.
The next two lemmas present the equations that dene implicitly the two playersbest response
functions in these Bayesian Nash equilibria. Their proofs are in appendices A4 and A5.10
Lemma 3.2 Given Es cuto¤ strategy, (As; Bs), with As > Bs, As best response is char-
acterized by two thresholds A (As; Bs) and B (As; Bs), with A (As; Bs) > B (As; Bs),
implicitly dened by the equations

1  
gh(A)
gl(A)
=
bB

1  F l (Bs)
  bA 1  F l (As)+ cA   cB
bA [1  F h (As)]  bB [1  F h (Bs)] + cB   cA (4)

1  
gh(B)
gl(B)
=
cB   bB

1  F l (Bs)

bB [1  F h (Bs)]  cB (5)
such that A submits to tier A if   A (; ), to tier B if  2 [B (; ) ; A (; )), and forgoes
submitting the project if  < B (; ).
Lemma 3.3 Given As cuto¤ strategy (As; Bs), E accepts a project submitted to tier A if and
only if   A (As; Bs), with A (As; Bs) given implicitly by

1  
fh(A)
f l(A)
1 Gh(As)
1 Gl(As)
= LA (6)
and accepts a project submitted to tier B if and only if   B (As; Bs), with B (As; Bs) given
implicitly by

1  
fh(B)
f l(B)
Gh(As) Gh(Bs)
Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
= LB (7)
The best-response functions, as elicited by equations (4), (5), (6) and (7), determine the equi-
librium strategies of the two players denoted by (A; 

B) and (

A; 

B). The next lemma, whose
proof is in appendix A6, presents the monotonicities of these best-response functions.
10We can model a situation in which A also prefers that an accepted project is of high quality, by having A receive an
additional benet t under this contingency. In this case, equation (4) becomes [bA + A Pr(hjfaAg; )] Pr(faAgj) 
cA  maxf[bB + B Pr(hjfaBg; )] Pr(faBgj) cB; 0g, which after some calculations can be rewritten as 1  g
h(A)
gl(A)
=
bB[1 F l(Bs)] bA[1 F l(As)]+cA cB
(bA+A)[1 Fh(As)] (bB+B)[1 Fh(Bs)]+cB cA
. Equations (3) and (5) are altered in a similar way. The ensuing analysis
and results are qualitatively similar to the case when A = B = 0 .
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Lemma 3.4 (i) A (As; Bs) is decreasing in Bs and increasing in As; (ii) B (As; Bs) is
constant in As and increasing in Bs; (iii) A (As; Bs) is decreasing in As and constant in Bs;
(iv) B (As; Bs) is decreasing in As and Bs, when As > Bs.
For generic payo¤ parameters and information structures, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
game is not necessarily unique. As in other frameworks, when sunspot equilibria emerge, they do
so because there exist di¤erent sets of self-fullling expectations for the same set of fundamentals
of the model. The next proposition identies a consistency requirement across di¤erent equilibria.
Its corollary provides a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium uniqueness.
Proposition 1 If   (A; B; A; B) and 0  (0A; 0B ; 0A; 0B) are two Bayesian Nash equilibria
with 0B > 

B, then it must be that 
0
A > 

A, 
0
B > 

B and 
0
A < 

A.
Corollary 3.1 Consider a Bayesian Nash equilibrium   (A; B; A; B) and assume that for
xed values of A and 

B, the two best-response functions A(

A; Bs) and B (As; 

B) as dened
by (4) and (7) have the unique xed point (A; 

B). Then, if
@A
@Bs
(A; 

B) 
@B
@As
(A; 

B) < 1 (8)
the equilibrium  is unique.
Before presenting the proof of these two results, we introduce the three panels in Figure 1 on
which we rely heavily in the rest of the analysis. In each panel, we depict the pairwise best-response
functions dened by (4)-(7), when the two variables not considered in the respective panel are kept
xed. A solid curve represents a best-response function when the remaining variables are xed
at the values in . A dashed curve depicts a best-response function when the remaining variables
are xed at the values in 0. For instance, in panel (a), the solid curve oA (As) represents the
best-response function A (As; 

B), while the dashed curve 
z
A (As) represents the best-response
function A (As; 
0
B). When there is no dashed curve, the function is the same in the two equi-
libria. For instance, in panel (a), oA (As) represents the best-response functions A (As; 

B) and
A (As; 
0
B), which by lemma 3.4(iii) are the same.
11 All curves are generic and are depicted only
11Similarly, for instance, in panel (b), oB (Bs) represents the best response functions B (

A; Bs) and B (
0
A ; Bs),
while oB (Bs) and 
z
B (Bs) represent the best response functions B (

A; Bs) and B (
0
A ; Bs), respectively.
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so as to exhibit the salient monotonicity property. In panel (c), since both curves are decreasing,
they are presented as crossing each other twice, so as to allow for either of them crossing from
below. To save on notation, we dene a partial order  on these curves by saying that for instance
zA (Bs)  oA (Bs) or oB (As)  zB (As) if, as is the case in panel (c), the rst curve is above
the second one in a panel with  on the horizontal axis and  on the vertical axis.
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 3.1. To prove proposition 1, rst note in panel (a), that
0B > 

B implies by lemma 3.4(i) that 
o
A (As)  zA (As). Since zA (As) is the same as oA (As),
it must be that 0A > 

A and 
0
A < 

A. Second, in panel (b), 
0
A < 

A implies by lemma 3.4(iv)
that zB (Bs)  oB (Bs). Since zB (Bs) is the same as oB (Bs), it must be that 0B > B and
0B > 

B. The second implication is consistent with the initial assumption. Finally, in panel (c),
0B > 

B implies by lemma 3.4(iv) that 
o
B (As)  zB (As), while 0A > A implies by lemma
3.4(i) that zA (Bs)  oA (Bs).
To show corollary 3.1, consider an equilibrium  = (A; 

B; 

A; 

B) such that for xed values
of A and 

B, the curves 
o
B (As) and 
o
A (Bs) satisfy a single-crossing property, with 
o
B (As)
having a steeper downward slope at the intersection of the two curves. In panel (c), this is the case
of the point of intersection that is in the upper left corner. Assume by contradiction that there
exists another equilibrium of the game, 0 = (0A; 
0
B ; 
0
A; 
0
B). Without loss of generality, we can
assume that 0B > 

B. In this case, by proposition 1, 
0
B > 

B implies 
0
B > 

B and 
0
A > 

A. In
turn, these imply oB (As)  zB (As) and zA (Bs)  oA (Bs). By inspecting panel (c) of Figure
1 (more precisely, the intersection of the two curves in the upper left corner) it follows that it must
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be that 0B < 

B and 
0
A > 

A. This is inconsistent with the initial assumption that 
0
B > 

B.
Thus the initial equilibrium is unique. Now, note that the slope of oB (As) at the equilibrium
values equals
h
@B
@As
(A; 

B)
i 1
. Thus oB (As) is steeper than 
o
A (Bs) if and only if
@A
@Bs
(A; 

B) >

@B
@As
(A; 

B)
 1
which, since both sides are negative, can be rewritten as in (8). 
Proposition 1 shows that if E is more stringent in his acceptance policy for tier B in equilibrium
0, (i.e., 0B > 

B), then rst, A is more reluctant to submit marginal projects to tier B, (0B > B),
and second, A is more inclined to submit marginal projects to tier A, (0A < A), since the
alternative is less appealing. Given these, E is also more stringent in his acceptance policy at
tier A, (0A > 

A), to make up for the lower expected quality of projects submitted. While these
feed-forward e¤ects make the result intuitive, proposition 1 ensures that the feed-back e¤ects, such
as the e¤ect of the increase in A on 

A, or of the decrease in 

A on 

B, do not o¤set them.
To understand corollary 3.1, consider two equilibria,  and 0, with corresponding strategies as
in the text of proposition 1. Note then that for a xed value of B, a higher value of 

A, (
0
A > 

A),
would induce A to increase. A higher 

A, together with a higher 

B, (
0
B > 

B), would increase
the quality of projects received by tier B, and thus induce a decrease in B. To instead have 

B
increasing and A decreasing (since 
0
B > 

B and 
0
A < 

A in  and 
0), B and 

A should feed
o¤ each other. This means that B should be higher because 

A is lower, and 

A should be lower
because B is higher. Thus, to have multiple equilibria, 

B has to be very responsive to a decrease
in A, while 

A has to be very responsive to an increase in 

B; these would o¤set the e¤ects of
the increases in B and 

A. In panel (c), this is the case precisely when 
o
B (As) and 
o
A (Bs)
intersect in the lower right corner where both have a steeper slope. Equation (8) is the mathematical
representation of the same condition.
4 Results
We examine the e¤ect of increases in the submission fees at the two tiers of evaluation on the
equilibrium strategies, and then employ these comparative statics results to investigate their e¤ect
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on the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium outcome. Note that unlike some of the other papers from the
literature, we do not calculate the optimal submission fees, but only elicit the e¤ect of a change in
these fees on the quality of projects that are implemented by the evaluator in the two tiers.12 We
present rst the main result from Barbos (2012) for the model with one tier of evaluation.
4.1 The model with one tier of evaluation
Consider a model as in section 2, only that with one tier of evaluation. In this case the agent only
has to decide on whether or not to submit the project for review. The next lemma states that in
the resulting game, an equilibrium exists, is unique, and must be in cuto¤ strategies.
Lemma 4.1 (Barbos (2012)) There exists a unique equilibrium of the game with one tier of
evaluation. This equilibrium is completely characterized by two values (; ) 2 [0; 1) (0; 1) such
that A submits a project if and only if   , and E accepts a project if and only if   .
The expected quality of projects that are implemented in this equilibrium, hPr (hj  ;   )+
lPr (lj  ;   ), is isomorphic to the probability Pr (hj  ;   ). The next proposition
elicits the e¤ect of an increase in the submission fee, c, on this measure.
Proposition 2 (Barbos (2012)) ddc Pr (hj  ;   ) > 0 if and only if
d
d
ln
fh()
f l()
>
d
d
ln
1  F h()
1  F l() (9)
Note that the term f
h()
f l() is the likelihood of the state h as inferred from Es equilibrium
minimum acceptance quality standard . On the other hand, given Es cuto¤ strategy, 1 Fh()
1 F l()
is the likelihood of state h as inferred from the fact that E accepted a project. Thus, in a model
with one tier of evaluation, an increase in the submission fee leads to an increase in the expected
quality of projects that are implemented if and only if the elasticity of the likelihood of a high
quality project that is inferred from the Es minimum quality standard is higher than the elasticity
of the likelihood of a high quality project that is inferred from the fact that E accepted a project.
12 In fact, in a variety of situations, these fees can be adjusted only at the margin. For instance, while laws could be
passed to make a prosecutors job of collecting evidence less costly, this may be possible only up to a limited extent.
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Since the intuition of this result resembles those of the corresponding results from the model with
multiple tiers, we defer presenting it to section 4.3.
4.2 The e¤ects of submission fees on equilibrium strategies
In the model with multiple tiers of evaluation, with generic signal distributions, it is not tractable
to obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium strategies amenable for direct comparative
statics analysis. Instead, we perform this analysis in three steps. First, we identify all correlations
between the signs of the changes in the equilibrium strategies that are imposed by (4)-(7) under
the assumed change in the underlying parameter. Second, we identify the paths of the equilibrium
strategies that are consistent with these correlations. Finally, for each equilibrium path, we verify
that the shifts in the pairwise best-response functions that are imposed by the changes in the
underlying parameter and in the equilibrium strategies are consistent with the assumed changes in
the equilibrium strategies. At this step, we identify the equilibrium paths that are artifacts of the
multiplicity of equilibria.
The case of a change in cA We start with the case of an increase in cA.13 Assuming that
cA increases by dcA > 0, by inspecting (4)-(7), one can infer the following necessary correlations
among the possible changes in the equilibrium strategies.
(a) From (4), if dA > 0 and d

B < 0, then d

A > 0.
(b) From (5), if dB > (<)0, then d

B > (<)0.
(c) From (6), if dA > (<)0, then d

A < (>)0.
(d) From (7), if dA > (<)0 and d

B > (<) 0, then d

B < (>)0.
Using these, we have the following possible equilibrium paths following an increase in cA.
1. Assume dA > 0. By (c), it follows that d

A < 0. If d

B > 0, then by (b) d

B > 0. But by
(d), if dA > 0 and d

B > 0, then it must be that d

B < 0. This contradicts the previous
assumption. Therefore, it must be that dB < 0, and thus by (b) that d

B < 0.
13 It is straightforward to see that this is qualitatively similar to a decrease in bA.
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2. Assume dA < 0. By (c), this implies that d

A > 0. By (a), this implies that d

B > 0. By
(b), this implies that dB > 0.
The rst of the two equilibrium paths is intuitive. Upon facing a higher cA, A is less inclined to
submit marginal products to tier A, and thus A increases. The increase in 

A leads to an increase
in the expected quality of projects received by tier A, which allows E to lower the corresponding
standards, and thus A decreases. The increase in 

A also leads to an increase in the expected
quality of projects submitted to tier B, which allows E to also lower B. This makes A more willing
to submit marginal projects to tier B, and thus B decreases. We depict these in Figure 2 below.
The solid curves represent the pairwise best-response functions when the remaining variables are
xed at the values from the initial equilibrium   (A; B; A; B), and the submission fee is cA.
The partially dashed curves xA (As) and 
x
A (Bs) represent the best-response functions when the
fee is c0A  cA + dcA, but the values of the remaining variables are still xed at (A; B; A; B).14
For instance, from (4), it follows that for xed values of B and 

B, to the same cuto¤ strategy
As, A responds with a higher A when cA increases to c0A. Thus, xA (As)  oA (As) in panel (a).
Similarly, xA (Bs)  oA (Bs) in panel (c). The dashed curves zA (As), zB (Bs), zA (Bs) and
14Thus, for instance, oA (As) represents the best response function A (As; 

B), as dened by (4), when the
submission fee to tier A is cA, while xA (As) represents A (As; 

B) when the submission fee in (4) is c
0
A. On the
other hand, zA (As), which is dened below, represents A (As; 
0
B ) when the submission fee to tier A is c
0
A. Finally,
oA (As) represents A (As; 

B) when the submission fee to tier A is cA or c
0
A, but also A (As; 
0
B ) when to tier A
when the fee is c0A. Note also that, for instance in panel (c) the values 

A and 

B from the initial equilibrium  are
at the intersection of the curves oA (Bs) and 
o
B (As), while the corresponding values from the equilibrium 
0 are
at the intersection of the curves zA (Bs) and 
z
B (As).
14
zB (As) represent the best-response functions that correspond to c
0
A, and to values of strategies
from the new equilibrium 0  (0A; 0B ; 0A; 0B). For instance, since dB < 0, from lemma 3.4(i),
it follows that at c0A, As best-response A is higher when Es cuto¤ for tier B is xed at 0B than
at B. This implies that 
z
A (As)  xA (As) in panel (a). Similarly, in panel (b), from lemma
3.4(iv) it follows that oB (Bs)  zB (Bs) because dA > 0. Finally, in panel (c), dB < 0 implies
zB (As)  oB (As), while dA < 0 implies xA (Bs)  zA (Bs). As seen in the gure, the
equilibrium path is consistent with either type of initial equilibrium.
As we show next, the second equilibrium path can arise only when the initial equilibrium is not
unique. Essentially, the second scenario emerges as a consequence of a coordination of expectations
on a di¤erent sunspot equilibrium in response to the change in the parameters of the model, rather
than being driven by an adjustment of the playersstrategies within the same equilibrium. Thus,
note that in panel (c) of Figure 3, dcA > 0 and dB < 0 imply 
z
A (Bs)  xA (Bs)  oA (Bs),
while dB > 0 implies 
o
B (As)  zB (As). Therefore, the only ways to have dB > 0 and dA < 0
are either if the initial equilibrium is in the upper left corner and the two curves do not satisfy the
single crossing condition, or if the initial equilibrium is in the lower right corner where oA (Bs)
crosses oB (As) from above. These are precisely the conditions under which the equilibrium is not
necessarily unique.
We collect these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider an equilibrium   (A; B; A; B) and assume dcA > 0. If  is unique,
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then dA > 0, d

B < 0, d

A < 0 and d

B < 0. If  is not unique, then it may also happen that
dA < 0, d

B > 0, d

A > 0 and d

B > 0.
Focusing on the case when the equilibrium is unique, note that while the increase in cA does
increase the quality of projects submitted to tier A (as dA > 0), it also leads to a decrease in
the expected quality of projects submitted between the two tiers (as dB < 0). Therefore, unlike
the case of a system of evaluation with one tier, when there are multiple tiers, a submission fee
increase is not unequivocally benecial with respect to the quality of projects submitted for review
because increases in submission fees to upper tiers exert negative externalities on the quality of
projects submitted to the lower tiers. Note that this insight hinges on the underlying assumption
that evaluation is imprecise; if evaluation was precise, an increase in cA would have no e¤ect on the
agents decision at the margin on whether to submit a project to tier B or to forgo submitting it.
The case of a change in cB Similarly to the previous analysis, assuming dcB > 0 (or dbB < 0),
one can infer the following necessary correlations among equilibrium strategies.
(a) From (4), if dB > 0 and d

A < 0, then d

A < 0.
(b) From (5), if dB > 0, then d

B > 0.
(c) From (6), if dA > (<)0, then d

A < (>)0.
(d) From (7), if dA > (<)0 and d

B > (<)0, then d

B < (>)0.
Therefore, the equilibrium paths that can emerge when cB increases are the following.
1. Assume dB > 0 and d

B > 0. By (d), it follows that d

A < 0, and then by (c) that d

A > 0.
2. Assume dB > 0 and d

B < 0. If d

A < 0, then by (c) d

A > 0.
3. Assume dB > 0 and d

B < 0. If d

A > 0, then by (c) d

A < 0.
4. Assume dB < 0. Then by (b), d

B < 0. By (d) it follows that d

A > 0, which then by (c)
implies that dA < 0.
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The third step of the analysis is along the lines of the case of an increase in cA and is thus
omitted. On the rst three equilibrium paths, when dcB > 0, A is more reluctant to submit low-
signal marginal projects to tier B, and thus dB > 0. On the rst two paths, A also abstains
from submitting high-signal marginal projects to tier B, and thus dA < 0. If the net e¤ect on
the quality of projects submitted to tier B is negative, E becomes more stringent in his acceptance
policy at tier B, and so dB > 0, as on the rst equilibrium path. If the net e¤ect is positive, E is
less stringent, and so dB < 0, as on the second equilibrium path. On both paths E becomes more
stringent at tier A since the expected quality of projects that are received at that tier is lower. The
third equilibrium path occurs when the quality of projects submitted to tier B increases signicantly
following the increase in B. In this case, 

B decreases su¢ ciently so as to induce an increase in 

A,
and a consequent decrease in A. The last equilibrium path emerges again only when the initial
equilibrium is not necessarily unique.15 We collect these results in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider an equilibrium   (A; B; A; B) and assume dcB > 0. If  is unique,
then dB > 0, and one of the following three equilibrium paths occurs: (i) d

B > 0, d

A < 0 and
dA > 0; (ii) d

B < 0, d

A < 0 and d

A > 0; (iii) d

B < 0, d

A > 0 and d

A < 0. If  is not
unique, then it may also happen that dB < 0, d

A > 0, d

A < 0, and d

B < 0.
The equilibrium path selection is a local property, in that for given values of the payo¤ parame-
ters, it is determined exclusively from the local properties of the signal structures in a neighborhood
of the initial equilibrium. In particular, depending on the change in the amount of information
extracted with a innitesimal change in the strategy of each player, the equilibrium may follow at
each starting point any of these paths. Therefore, additional regularities on the equilibrium paths
can only be obtained only by making additional assumptions on the payo¤ parameters of the model
and the information structure beyond that imposed by assumptions 1 and 2.
15To see this, note the following in a (As; Bs) panel. First, from (4), dcB > 0 implies 
o
A (Bs)  xA (Bs).
Second, also from lemma 3.4(i), dA < 0 implies 
x
A (Bs)  zA (Bs). Third, from lemma 3.4(iv ), dB < 0 implies
zB (As)  oB (As). It is then straightforward to see that if oB (As) is steeper than oA (Bs) at the intersection
point, it must be that dA < 0.
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4.3 The e¤ects of submission fees on the equilibrium expected quality of the
projects that are implemented
In this section, we examine the e¤ect of a change in the two submission fees on the e¢ ciency
of the equilibrium outcome. The measures of e¢ ciency that we employ here are the expected
qualities of projects implemented by the evaluator in the two tiers, which are isomorphic with
Pr (hj  A;   A), for tier A, and Pr (hjA    B;   B), for tier B. The next proposition
elicits the e¤ect of an increase in cA on these two values. We restrict attention to the more
interesting case where the initial equilibrium is unique, and thus the comparative statics are driven
by the fundamentals of the model rather than equilibrium selection.
Proposition 5 Assume that the equilibrium (A; 

B; 

A; 

B) is unique. Then
(i) ddcA Pr (hj  A;   A) > 0 if and only if dd ln
fh(A)
f l(A)
> dd ln
1 Fh(A)
1 F l(A)
.
(ii) ddcA Pr (hjA    B;   B) > 0 if and only if dd ln
fh(B)
f l(B)
> dd ln
1 Fh(B)
1 F l(B)
.
Proof. By BayesRule, we have
Pr (hj  A;   A) =
Pr (  A;   Ajh) Pr(h)
Pr
 
  A;   Ajh

Pr(h) + Pr
 
  A;   Ajl

Pr(l)
=

 + (1  ) Pr(

A;Ajl)
Pr(A;Ajh)
=

 + 1 
1 Gh(A)
1 Gl(A)
1 Fh(A)
1 Fl(A)
(10)
where for the third equality we used the conditional independence of the two playerssignals. There-
fore, Pr (hj  ;   ) increases following an increase in cA if and only if the sum ln 1 G
h(A)
1 Gl(A)
+
ln
1 Fh(A)
1 F l(A)
increases. From (6), written in equilibrium, we have ln 1 G
h(A)
1 Gl(A)
= lnLA   ln 1   
ln
fh(A)
f l(A)
, so Pr (hj  A;   A) increases if and only if ln 1 F
h(A)
1 F l(A)
  ln fh(A)
f l(A)
increases. But
d
dcA

ln
1  F h(A)
1  F l(A)
  ln f
h(A)
f l(A)

=
d
d

ln
1  F h(A)
1  F l(A)
  ln f
h(A)
f l(A)

dA
dcA

(11)
Since by proposition 3, we have d

A
dcA
< 0 the proof of part (i) is complete. The proof of part (ii)
follows the same steps.16 
16Note that Pr (A    Bjq) = Gq(A) Gq(B), and that one can use (7) to compute G
h(A) Gh(B)
Gl(A) Gl(B)
.
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To understand these results, consider the e¤ect of an increase in cA on Pr (hj  A;   A).
Note that by proposition 3, the increase in cA has a positive e¤ect on the expected quality of
projects that are implemented in tier A by increasing the quality of projects that are submitted (A
increases), and a negative e¤ect by decreasing Es standards of acceptance (A decreases). On net,
the fee increase has a positive e¤ect if Pr (hj  A;   A) is more responsive to the corresponding
increase in A than to the decrease in 

A. Now, as seen in (10), Pr (hj  A;   A) is a
monotone transformation of the product of the likelihoods of state h inferred from the fact that A
submitted the project,
1 Gh(A)
1 Gl(A)
, and from the fact that E accepted it, 1 F
h(A)
1 F l(A)
. Therefore, the
responsiveness of Pr (hj  A;   A) with respect to A can be elicited from the elasticity of
the likelihood
1 Gh(A)
1 Gl(A)
with respect to A, while the responsiveness of Pr (hj  A;   A) with
respect to A can be elicited from the elasticity of the likelihood
1 Fh(A)
1 F l(A)
with respect to A. In
turn, the former elasticity can be elicited from Es decision problem, described by (6), as a function
of the elasticity of f
h(A)
f l(A)
with respect to A. It follows that the sign of
d
dcA
Pr (hj  A;   A)
can be elicited by comparing the two elasticities as in the text of the proposition.
An inspection of the results of propositions 2 and 5 reveals that the e¤ects of an increase in
the submission fee to the upper tier of a tiered system of evaluation on the expected qualities
of projects implemented by both tiers are qualitatively similar to the e¤ect of an increase in the
submission fee in the case with one tier of evaluation. In particular, because the increase in cA
leads to unambiguous decreases in both A and 

B, the e¤ect of an increase in cA on the quality of
projects implemented by the two tiers can be elicited solely by investigating the elasticities of the
two likelihoods at the equilibrium values of A and 

B.
Intuitively, the e¤ect of the increase in the submission fee on the expected quality of projects
implemented in a certain tier depends on the corresponding e¤ect on the likelihoods of h as inferred
from the facts that (i) the agent submitted a project, and (ii) the evaluator accepted it. A higher
submission fee to the upper tier (or to the single tier, in the case of a system of evaluation with
one tier) increases the former likelihood, but decreases the latter. The key fact is then that the
e¤ect on the former likelihood can be elicited from the evaluators decision problem, as a function
of the elasticity of the likelihood of h as inferred from the evaluators minimum quality standard
(this is because this minimum standard is determined in the evaluators problem precisely by the
expected quality of projects that are submitted). Therefore, the desired e¤ect can be elicited from
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the evaluators information structure in the neighborhood of a particular equilibrium.
The next proposition presents the e¤ect of an increase in cB. Its proof shares the same steps as
the proof of proposition 5 up to equation (11) and is thus omitted.
Proposition 6 Assume that the equilibrium (A; 

B; 

A; 

B) is unique. Then
(i) ddcB Pr (hj  A;   A) > 0 if and only if
h
d
d ln
1 Fh(A)
1 F l(A)
  dd ln
fh(A)
f l(A)
i
dA
dcB
> 0
(ii) ddcB Pr (hjA    B;   B) > 0 if and only if
h
d
d ln
1 Fh(B)
1 F l(B)
  dd ln
fh(B)
f l(B)
i
dB
dcB
> 0.
Note that by proposition 4, the endogenous condition d

t
dcB
< 0 occurs when the increase in cB
leads to an increase in the quality of projects submitted to tier t 2 fA;Bg (due to A shifting some
high-signal marginal projects from tier B to tier A). Thus, to elicit the e¤ect of an increase in cB
on the quality of projects implemented by the two tiers, one needs to investigate the elasticities of
the two likelihoods in the neighborhoods of A and 

B, respectively, and the sign of the change
in the evaluators strategy, as determined by the corresponding e¤ect on the quality of projects
submitted for review at each tier. In di¤erent words, since unlike the case of an increase in cA, the
increase in cB does not have unambiguous e¤ects on the likelihood of h as inferred from the fact
that the agent submitted the project to a certain tier, the e¤ect of a higher cB on the expected
quality of projects implemented into a particular tier depends not only on the elasticities of these
likelihoods, but also on the sign of the e¤ect of the increase in cB on these likelihoods.
4.4 Introducing a second tier of evaluation
We close by presenting a proposition that compares the equilibrium of a game with one tier of
evaluation, and the equilibrium from the game with both tiers. More precisely, we analyze the
impact of introducing an additional upper or lower tier in a system of evaluation in which only one
tier had existed.17 The proof of the proposition is in appendix A7.
Proposition 7 Let
 
1A ; 
1
A

and
 
1B ; 
1
B

be the equilibria of the games with only tier of eval-
uation A or B, respectively. Also, let
 
2A ; 
2
B ; 
2
A ; 
2
B

be the equilibrium of the game with both
17The payo¤ characteristics of each tier are assumed identical accross games. Thus, for instance, bA, cA and LA
are the same in the game in which only tier A exists and in the game with two tiers of evaluation, A and B.
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tiers. Then, 2A > 
1
A , 
2
A < 
1
A , 
2
B > 
1
B and 
2
B > 
1
B .
Thus, the introduction of a lower tier B in a system of evaluation in which only tier A had
existed induces A to be more selective in submitting to tier A, (2A > 1A ), which allows E to be
less stringent in his standards of acceptance at that tier, (2A < 
1
A ). On the other hand, the
introduction of an upper tier A in a system in which only tier B had existed lowers the expected
quality of projects received by tier B, inducing E to become more stringent, (2B > 1B ). In turn,
this makes A more selective in submitting marginal projects to tier B, (2B > 1B ).
These results have two policy implications. First, 2A > 
1
A suggests an additional intuitive
mechanism to induce more self-screening by the agent at tier A. Thus, by introducing a new lower
benet tier of evaluation, tier A receives for review projects of higher quality (however, note that
since the quality of projects submitted between the two tiers decreases in this case, this would not
lower the burden on the evaluator). On the other hand, 2B > 
1
B suggests that by introducing
a new higher benet tier, A will refrain from submitting low-quality projects to the lower tier B,
decreasing the burden on the evaluator. Moreover, since 2B > 
1
B it also follows that introducing
tier A increases the quality of projects implemented between the two tiers. These ndings lend
additional support for a tiered system of evaluation as an e¢ cient mechanism of project screening.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the e¤ect of an increase in the submission fees on the e¢ ciency of the
equilibrium outcome in a game in which the owner of a project of unknown quality faces a tiered
system of evaluation to which he can submit his project for review. By considering a setup in
which evaluation is imperfect, and thus the evaluator is a strategic player who adjusts his strategy
in response to changes in the fundamentals of the model, we argue that increases in these fees are
not always benecial either for the expected quality of projects that are submitted for review or
for the expected quality of projects that are implemented. These ndings suggest that in those
situations where it is likely the agents decision of whether or not to submit a project is informative
to the evaluator of the projects quality, one may need to account for the evaluators response to
a change in the expected quality of projects submitted for review when examining the optimal
submission fee.
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Appendix
Appendix A1.
First, for Es beliefs, by BayesRule we have
Pr(hjfstg; ) = j(fstg; jh) Pr(h)
j(fstg; jh) Pr(h) + j(fstg; jl) Pr(l)
where j(j) denotes the conditional probability density function of the relevant continuous ran-
dom variable. Since As action and the signal  are conditionally independent, it follows that
j(fstg; jq) = Pr(fstgjq)f q(), and thus that
Pr(hjfstg; ) = Pr(fstgjh)f
h()
Pr(fstgjh)fh() + Pr(fstgjl)f l() (1  )
=
Pr(fstgjh)f
h()
f l()

1 
Pr(fstgjh)fh()f l() 1  + Pr(fstgjl)
(12)
Since, the last term is increasing in f
h()
f l()
, the fact that dd
h
fh()
f l()
i
> 0 implies dd Pr(hjfstg; ) > 0.
Thus, given (1), it follows that for any Sag, E responds with a cuto¤ strategy by accepting a project
submitted to tier t if and only if   t(Sag), with t(Sag) 2 [0; 1]. Thus, in any equilibrium, the
evaluator uses a cuto¤ strategy.
On the other hand, for As belief we have
Pr(fatgj) = Pr(fatgj; h) Pr(hj) + Pr(fatgj; l) Pr(lj)
= Pr(fatgjh) Pr(hj) + Pr(fatgjl) Pr(lj)
= [Pr(fatgjh)  Pr(fatgjl)] Pr(hj) + Pr(fatgjl) (13)
where for the second equality we used the fact that  is redundant for As inference about Es
action when conditioning on the quality of the project. Since in any equilibrium, the evaluator
uses a cuto¤ strategy, we have fatg = f :   tsg, and thus Pr(fatgjh)   Pr(fatgjl) = Pr( 
tsjh)   Pr(  Isjl) = F l(ts)   F h(ts). The monotone likelihood ratio property implies rst
order stochastic dominance, and thus F l(ts)   F h(ts) > 0. On the other hand, by BayesRule
22
we have
Pr(hj) = g
h()
gh() + gl() (1  ) =
gh()
gl()

1 
gh()
gl()

1  + 1
(14)
which is increasing in g
h()
gl()
, and thus increasing in  since dd
h
gh()
gl()
i
> 0. Thus, dd Pr(fatgj) > 0.
Now, bA Pr (faAgj)   cA  max f0; bB Pr (faBgj)  cBg if and only if Pr (faAgj)  cAbA and
bA Pr (faAgj) bB Pr (faBgj)  cA cB. Since in any equilibrium, fatg = f :   tsg, it follows
that
@
@
[bA Pr (faAgj)  bB Pr (faBgj)] =
=
@
@
[bA Pr (  Asj)  bB Pr (  Bsj)]
=
@
@

bA [Pr (  Asjh; ) Pr(hj) + Pr (A  Asjl; ) Pr(lj)]
 bB [Pr (  Bsjh; ) Pr(hj) + Pr (  Bsjl; ) Pr(lj)]

=
@
@

bA [Pr (  Asjh) Pr(hj) + Pr (A  Asjl) Pr(lj)]
 bB [Pr (  Bsjh) Pr(hj) + Pr (  Bsjl) Pr(lj)]

=
@
@

bA [fPr (  Asjh)  Pr (A  Asjl)gPr(hj)] + Pr (A  Asjl)
 bB [fPr (  Bsjh)  Pr (B  Bsjl)gPr(hj)] + Pr (B  Bsjl)

= fbA [Pr (  Asjh)  Pr (A  Asjl)]  bB [Pr (  Bsjh)  Pr (  Bsjl)]g @
@
[Pr(hj)]
=
n
bA
h
F l(As)  F h(As)
i
  bB
h
F l(Bs)  F h(Bs)
io @
@
[Pr(hj)] (15)
where for the third equality we used again Pr(fatgj; q) = Pr(fatgjq). Since @@ [Pr(hj)] > 0, it
follows that @@ [bA Pr (faAgj)  bB Pr (faBgj)] has the same sign for all values of , i.e., the sign
of bA

F l(As)  F h(As)
  bB F l(Bs)  F h(Bs).
Let 0 be the solution to bA Pr (faAgj0)   bB Pr (faBgj0) = cA   cB, 00 be the solution to
Pr (faAgj00) = cAbA and 000 be the solution to Pr (faBgj000) =
cB
bB
, and assume for the time be-
ing that all these solutions are interior in [0; 1]. We have two cases to consider. (i) Assume
bA

F l(As)  F h(As)
   bB F l(Bs)  F h(Bs) > 0. Then, A will submit the project to tier A
for  2 [0; 1]\ [00; 1], to tier B for  2  2 [0; 0]\ [000; 1], and will not submit the project for the
rest of the values of . (ii) Assume bA

F l(As)  F h(As)
  bB F l(Bs)  F h(Bs) < 0. Then,
A will submit the project to tier B for  2 [0; 1]\ [000; 1], to tier A for  2 [0; 0]\ [00; 1], and will
not submit the project for the rest of the values of . In either case, the set of values of  for which
A submits the project to each evaluator is connected. The analysis for the cases when the solutions
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to the equations that dene 0, 00 and 000 are not interior is similar and leads to the same salient
conclusions. For instance, if bA Pr (faAgj0)  bB Pr (faBgj0) > cA   cB for all  2 [0; 1], but 00 is
interior, then A will submit the project to tier A for  2 [00; 1] and will not submit the project for
the rest of the values of . 
Appendix A2. Proof of Lemma 3.1
We show that if Bs  As, then condition (3) is never satised, i.e., that bB Pr (  Bsj)  
cB < max f0; bA Pr (  Asj)  cAg. To this end, since Bs  As implies Pr (  Asj) 
Pr (  Bsj), it is enough to show that
bB Pr (  Asj)  cB < max f0; bA Pr (  Asj)  cAg
To this aim, we will argue that whenever bB Pr (  Asj) cB  bA Pr (  Asj) cA, it must be
that bB Pr (  Asj)  cB < 0, which will complete the argument. Since bA > bB, by assumption
1(i), this is equivalent to showing that
Pr (  Asj)  cA   cB
bA   bB implies Pr (  Asj) <
cB
bB
To show this implication, it is enough to show that cA cBbA bB <
cB
bB
. Rearranging this last condition,
we conclude that it is satised whenever assumption 1(ii) is satised, so the proof of the lemma is
complete. 
Appendix A3.
From (2), it is straightforward to see that this happens if and only if
@
@
[bA Pr (  Asj)  bB Pr (  Bsj)] > 0
Lemma 5.1 provides conditions under which this is satised.
Lemma 5.1 Let e1 be the solution to f l(e1)fh(e1) = 1, and let e2 be the solution to bAbB = F l(e1) Fh(e1)F l(e2) Fh(e2)
on [e1; 1]. (i) If As  e2, then @@ [bA Pr (  Asj)  bB Pr (  Bsj)] > 0 for any Bs < As.
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(ii) If As > e2, then there exists a neighborhood NAs of e1, such that when Bs 2 NAs, we have
@
@ [bA Pr (  Asj)  bB Pr (  Bsj)] < 0.
Proof. From (15), we have that when evaluators employ cuto¤ strategies As and Bs,
@
@
[bA Pr (  Asj)  bB Pr (  Bsj)] =
=
n
bA
h
F l(As)  F h(As)
i
  bB
h
F l(Bs)  F h(Bs)
io @
@
[Pr(hj)]
with @@ [Pr(hj)] > 0.
Note that dd

F l()  F h() = 0() f l()  fh() = 0()  = e1. Moreover, we have
d
d
h
F l()  F h()
i
> 0() f
l()
fh()
> 1
Therefore, since f
l(e1)
fh(e1) = 1 (by the denition of e1) and dd h f l()fh()i < 0 (from assumption 2(ii)),
we have that
d
d
h
F l()  F h()
i
> 0()  < e1 (16)
Now, if As < e2, where, by its denition, e2 is the solution to bAbB = F l(e1) Fh(e1)F l(e2) Fh(e2) , then
bA

F l(As)  F h(As)
  bB F l(Bs)  F h(Bs) > 0 for any Bs < As. To see this, assume rst
that As > e1. Then, since e2 > As > e1, by (16) F l(As)   F h(As)  F l(e2)   F h(e2) =
bB
bA

F l(e1)  F h(e1). Thus, bA F l(As)  F h(As)  bB F l(e1)  F h(e1) > 0. Since F l(Bs) 
F h(Bs)  F l(e1) F h(e1) by the denition of e1, it follows that indeed bA F l(As)  F h(As) 
bB

F l(Bs)  F h(Bs)

> 0 for any Bs. On the other hand, if As < e1 then F l(As) F h(As) >
F l(Bs)   F h(Bs) by (16) and the fact that As > Bs. Since bA > bB, it follows again that
bA

F l(As)  F h(As)
  bB F l(Bs)  F h(Bs) > 0 for any Bs < As.
On the other hand, if As > e2 and Bs is su¢ ciently close to e1, then bA F l(As)  F h(As) 
bB

F l(Bs)  F h(Bs)

< 0. 
To understand the lemma, note rst that e1 is the point at which the di¤erence F l()   F h()
is maximized, whereas when As is su¢ ciently high, the di¤erence F l(As)   F h(As) is small.
Therefore, when As is high and Bs is close to e1, the probability that a high-quality project is
identied as such from the evaluators signal is higher when submitting it to tier B. The likelihood
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of a high-quality project is increasing in the signal . Thus, given the low probability of acceptance
at tier A, when A has a higher signal, he is more likely to submit the project to tier B in order to
have it identied as being of high quality and accepted. On the other hand, if cA is small enough,
the expected payo¤ from submitting the project to tier A may be positive even when  is small
and As is high. Therefore, when A has a low signal he prefers submitting the project to tier A
rather than not submitting it at all. On the other hand, As strategy of submitting to tier B for
high signals and to tier A for lower signals, Es best response is precisely to adopt a high As and
a moderate Bs. Therefore, negative assortative matching may occur in equilibrium.
Appendix A4. Proof of Lemma 3.2
Employing (14) in (13), it follows that
Pr(fatgj) =
gh()
gl()

1 
gh()
gl()

1  + 1
h
1  F h (ts)
i
+
1
gh()
gl()

1  + 1
h
1  F l (ts)
i
(17)
From (2), under the equilibrium regularity that we assume throughout, we have then that given
As and Bs, A submits a project to tier A if and only if
bA Pr (faAgj)  cA  bB Pr (faBgj)  cB ()
bA

gh()
gl()

1  
h
1  F h (As)
i
+
h
1  F l (As)
i
 bB

gh()
gl()

1  
h
1  F h (Bs)
i
+
h
1  F l (Bs)
i

 (cA   cB)

gh()
gl()

1   + 1

()
gh()
gl()

1  
n
bA
h
1  F h (As)
i
  bB
h
1  F h (Bs)
i
+ cB   cA
o

 bB
h
1  F l (Bs)
i
  bA
h
1  F l (As)
i
+ cA   cB
The last inequality implies thatA employs a cuto¤As dened by (4) provided that bA

1  F h (As)
 
bB

1  F h (Bs)

+ cB   cA > 0 and bB

1  F l (Bs)
   bA 1  F l (As) + cA   cB. These con-
ditions are not satised generically, but they are necessary conditions for the regular equilibrium
under consideration. To see this, note rst that from the argument in appendix A1, a neces-
sary and su¢ cient condition for positive assortative matching is that bA

F l(As)  F h(As)
  
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bB

F l(Bs)  F h(Bs)

> 0, which implies by direct computation that
bA
h
1  F h (As)
i
  bB
h
1  F h (Bs)
i
> bA
h
1  F l (As)
i
  bB
h
1  F l (Bs)
i
(18)
Now, we have three cases to consider. (i) If cA   cB < bA

1  F l (As)
   bB 1  F l (Bs),
then it immediately follows that bB

1  F l (Bs)
   bA 1  F l (As) + cA   cB < 0, but also
that bA

1  F h (As)
   bB 1  F h (Bs) + cB   cA > 0 by using (18). So A will never submit
a project to tier B, which is something that we precluded by the regularity assumption. (ii) If
cA cB > bA

1  F h (As)
 bB 1  F h (Bs), then it immediately follows that bA 1  F h (As) 
bB

1  F h (Bs)

+cB cA < 0, but also that bB

1  F l (Bs)
 bA 1  F l (As)+cA cB > 0 by
using (18). So A will never submit a project to tier A, which is again something that is precluded
by the regularity assumption. (iii) Finally, the case when bA

1  F h (As)
  bB 1  F h (Bs) >
cA   cB > bA

1  F l (As)
  bB 1  F l (Bs) corresponds to the case where A submits a project
to tier A if and only if (4) is satised.
When (4) is not satised, A submits a project to tier B if and only if bB Pr (faBgj)  cB, which
by straightforward computations using (17), implies A employs a cuto¤ Bs dened by (5). 
Appendix A5. Proof of Lemma 3.3
For the evaluator, from (1) and (12) it follows that E will accept a project submitted to tier t if
and only if
Pr(fstgjh)f
h()
f l()

1 
Pr(fstgjh)fh()f l() 1  + Pr(fstgjl)
 Lt
1 + Lt
() f
h()
f l()

1  
Pr(fstgjh)
Pr(fstgjl)  Lt
Thus, given the cuto¤s As and Bs employed by A, E will accept a project submitted to tier A
with quality signal  if and only if
fh()
f l()

1  
1 Gh(As)
1 Gl(As)
 LA
and E will accept a project submitted to tier B with quality signal  if and only if
fh()
f l()

1  
Gh(As) Gh(Bs)
Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
 LB
27
Therefore, indeed, the two evaluators employ cuto¤ strategies with cuto¤s dened by (6) and (7).
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Appendix A6. Proof of Lemma 3.4
Parts (i) and (ii) are immediate. The proof of part (iii) is identical to the corresponding proof from
the case of a unique evaluator presented in Barbos (2012). For part (iv), since f
h()
f l()
is increasing
in , from (7) it follows that B () is decreasing in As if and only if
d
dAs

Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
Gh(As) Gh(Bs)

< 0() g
h(As)
gl(As)
>
Gh(As) Gh(Bs)
Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
(19)
where we used the fact that As > Bs. Similarly, B () is decreasing in Bs if and only if
d
dBs

Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
Gh(As) Gh(Bs)

< 0() G
h(As) Gh(Bs)
Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
>
gh(Bs)
gl(Bs)
(20)
We will show that (19) and (20) are satised under assumption 2(ii). Since g
h(u)
gl(u)
is increas-
ing in u, it follows that for u 2 [Bs; As), we have g
h(As)
gl(As)
> g
h(u)
gl(u)
, and thus gh (As) g
l (u) >
gl (As) g
h (u). Integrating this last inequality with respect to u between Bs and As, we obtain
gh (As)
h
Gl (As) Gl (Bs)
i
> gl (As)
h
Gh (As) Gh (Bs)
i
which immediately then implies (19). On the other hand, g
h(Bs)
gl(Bs)
< g
h(u)
gl(u)
for u 2 (Bs; As], implies
gh (Bs) g
l (u) < gl (Bs) g
h (u), which integrated with respect to u between Bs and As, implies
gh(Bs)
h
Gl(As) Gl(Bs)
i
< gl(Bs)
h
Gh(As) Gh(Bs)
i
which implies (20). This completes the proof of the lemma. 
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Appendix A7. Proof of Proposition 7
From Barbos (2012), with only one tier of evaluation, the equilibrium is given by

1  
gh(1t )
gl(1t )
=
ct   bt

1  F l  1t 
bt

1  F h  1t   ct (21)

1  
fh(1t )
f l(1t )
1 Gh(1t )
1 Gl(1t )
= Lt (22)
where
 
1t ; 1t

denotes the equilibrium strategies of the game in which E only o¤ers tier t 2 fA;Bg.
Consider rst the case when the initial tier is A, and then tier B is introduced. Assume by
contradiction that 2A  1A . Then

1  
fh(1A )
f l(1A )
= LA
1 Gl(1A )
1 Gh(1A )
 LA 1 G
l(2A )
1 Gh(2A )
=

1  
fh(2A )
f l(2A )
where the rst equality follows from (22) with t = A, the second equality follows from (6), and
the inequality from 2A  1A and the fact that dd
h
1 Gh()
1 Gl()
i
> 0.18 Thus, f
h(1A )
f l(1A )
 fh(2A )
f l(2A )
, so
by assumption 2(ii), we have that 2A  1A . Therefore, from (21), 1 
gh(1A )
gl(1A )
=
cA bA[1 F l(1A )]
bA[1 Fh(1A )] cA

cA bA[1 F l(2A )]
bA[1 Fh(2A )] cA
. On the other hand, from (4), we have 1 
gh(2A )
gl(2A )
=
bB[1 F l(2B )] bA[1 F l(2A )]+cA cB
bA[1 Fh(2A )] bB[1 Fh(2B )]+cB cA
.
We show next that 1 
gh(2A )
gl(2A )
>
cA bA[1 F l(2A )]
bA[1 Fh(2A )] cA
, which would then imply that g
h(2A )
gl(2A )
>
gh(1A )
gl(1A )
,
and thus that 2A > 
1
A contradicting the initial assumption. Thus, note that
bB

1  F l  2B   bA 1  F l  2A + cA   cB
bA

1  F h  2A   bB 1  F h  2B + cB   cA > cA   bA

1  F l  2A 
bA

1  F h  2A   cA ()
bB

1  F l  2B   cB
cB   bB

1  F h  2B  > cA   bA

1  F l  2A 
bA

1  F h  2A   cA
But this last inequality follows from the fact that 2A > 
2
B implies from (4) and (5) that
bB

1  F l  2B   bA 1  F l  2A + cA   cB
bA

1  F h  2A   bB 1  F h  2B + cB   cA > cB   bB

1  F l  2B 
bB

1  F h  2B   cB
Therefore, indeed 2A > 
1
A , which then from (22) and (6) immediately also implies that 
2
A < 
1
A .
For the second part of the proof, consider the case when the initial tier is B and then tier
18To see this last fact, just let As = 1 in equation (20).
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A is introduced, and assume by contradiction that 2B  1B . From (21) and (5), this implies
that 2B  1B . Therefore, from (22) it follows that 1 
fh(1B )
f l(1B )
= LB
1 Gl(1B )
1 Gh(1B )
 LB 1 G
l(2B )
1 Gh(2B )
.
Therefore, to complete the contradiction argument, it would be enough to show that 1 
fh(2B )
f l(2B )
>
LB
1 Gl(2B )
1 Gh(2B )
, because this would immediately imply 2B > 
1
B . But from (7) we have

1 
fh(2B )
f l(2B )
=
LB
Gl(2A ) Gl(2B )
Gh(2A ) Gh(2B )
, so it su¢ ces to show that G
l(2A ) Gl(2B )
Gh(2A ) Gh(2B )
>
1 Gl(2B )
1 Gh(2B )
. This is true from (19).
Therefore, indeed 2B > 
1
B , which from (21) and (5) also implies that 
2
B > 
1
B . This completes
the proof of the proposition. 
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